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I. INTRODUCTION
Tort law is frequently described as a system in "crisis."'
* Stephen D. Sugarman is a Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley
School of Law.
** Stephanie M. Wildman is a Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco School
of Law, and is a Visiting Professor, 1989-90, at the University of California, Hastings College
of the Law.
The author wishes to thank Catharine Wells Hantzis and Jean Love for their comments
on an earlier draft of this review, and Diane Bessette, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, Class of 1990, for excellent research assistance.
1. Recent tort reform law review articles using the word "crisis" in the title include:
Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 (1987); Abraham, Making
Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1987); Priest, Puzzles of the Tort
Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1987); Sugarman, Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 329 (1987).
Several recent articles, although not explicitly using the word "crisis," allude to the
seriousness of problems with the current system in the introductory text of the article. See,
e.g., O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort.- Preaccident Guarantees of
Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985); Pierce, Institutional Aspects of
Tort Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 917 (1985); Schwartz & Mahshigian, Failure to Identify the
Defendant in Tort Law.- Towards a Legislative Solution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 941 (1985).
In addition, critiquing American tort law has been a cottage industry for legal scholars.
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Although articles criticize the existing tort system, these scholarly
assessments try either to justify the common law system 2 or to con-
struct theoretical support for modifications to the system.3 Criticizing
the critics, Izhak Englard noted that the "confidence in the possibility
of elaborating systems at a high level of abstraction capable of provid-
ing concrete legal solutions" was surprising, particularly given the
Anglo-American common law pragmatic tradition. And so it is with
appreciation that the reader concerned with torts and the system's
contradictions can study Professor Stephen D. Sugarman's book,
Doing Away with Personal Injury Law,' and find not only the criti-
cisms of the tort system, but also proposed solutions to the problems
and even strategies for making those solutions reality.
In his book, Sugarman proposes moving toward the elimination
of personal injury law. He replaces tort law by treating the compen-
sation of victims, whether by accident or illness, separately from any
question of deterrence or punishment.6 The reader may disagree
with Sugarman.7 I quarrel with his simplification of deterrence con-
cerns and his handling of compensation for those not fully employed
under the current societal definition of employment.' Nevertheless,
the book's achievement is in not only cataloging the ills of the per-
sonal injury system, but also advocating possible solutions to those
For recent law review symposia on tort reform, see Alternative Compensation Schemes and
Tort Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 548 (1985); Issues in Tort Reform, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317
(1987); Torts Symposium, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1986).
2. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Epstein, A Theory
of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a
System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1972); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Posner, Killing or
Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J.L. & EcON. 201 (1971); Posner, Strict Liability:
A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
3. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts. An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Calabresi, Faults, Accidents and the Wonderful
World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Calabresi, The Decision for
Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965).
4. Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 30 (1980).
5. S. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989).
6. Id. at 81.
7. Jeffrey O'Connell writes "one can quarrel with some of his thoughts and ideas."
O'Connell, Forward to S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at xi.
8. Homemakers, that is those working full-time at home caring for children,
housekeeping, and cooking, as well as all the nurturing tasks that make human life possible,
are not included in the present government definitions of "unemployed." See, e.g.,
EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP'T, 1984-85 ANNUAL PLANNING INFORMATION 98 (1984)
(California's definition of "unemployed persons").
[Vol. 44:877
HeinOnline  -- 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 878 1989-1990
ENLIGHTENED SOCIAL INSURANCE
ills. It offers a good beginning for further debate. This Book Review
summarizes the arguments for eliminating tort law as it presently
functions, describes Professor Sugarman's suggestions for replacing
tort law, and comments on these recommendations.
II. WHY Do AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW?
For those unfamiliar with the litany of complaints about tort
law, Part I of the book provides a good summary. Justifications for
tort law classically rely on the goals of safety, compensation, and jus-
tice or fairness. Sugarman addresses each in turn and rejects the
notion that any of these goals is achieved under the current tort law
system. Without minimizing the importance of these goals,
Sugarman suggests they would be better accomplished by separating
compensation from safety, thereby achieving greater societal justice.
A. The Safety Goal
The first chapter addresses the safety goal of tort law, attacking
the notion that the existence of tort law deters injury-producing
behavior. Sugarman compares arguments made by law and econom-
ics theorists and the otherwise ideologically different plaintiffs' per-
sonal injury bar, noting that these groups both support the view that
tort law serves a deterrent function.9 However, the deterrent poten-
tial of tort law is undermined by the presence of liability insurance, 0
a phenomenon of relatively recent origin. I I Consequently, a potential
tortfeasor, who is insured, may not fear the crushing burden of liabil-
ity (knowing of the insurance protection) and therefore would not be
deterred from acting tortiously.12 Sugarman urges that even "existing
regulatory, economic, moral, and self-preservation pressures fail to
control all dangerous conduct that society would like to deter,'"'3 and
that the deterrence function of tort law adds only marginal safety
gains. He emphasizes that the empirical data proving that tort law
works successfully as a deterrent is thin. 14
While Sugarman accuses those defenders of tort law's deterrent
9. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 4.
10. Id. at 12 & n.24.
11. "Liability insurance did not appear until the end of the 19th century." M. FRANKLIN
& R. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 638 (4th ed. 1987).
12. Some would argue that the crushing rates of liability insurance compel tortfeasors to
be careful. But rates seem to go up simply from involvement in an accident, whether a party is
at fault or not. For an interesting discussion of insurance, see K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING
RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986).
13. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 21.
14. Id.
1990]
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value of basing their arguments on thin evidence and of being too
optimistic in supposing that deterrence works,' 5 this criticism could
be directed at Sugarman as well. He asserts that tort law has no
deterrent effect or a marginal one at best,' 6 but do we really know?
This is a place where more empirical data would be helpful, but
Sugarman does not provide it.
Arguments about the deterrent potential of tort law are frustrat-
ing because no one seems to really know whether it is effective. Evi-
dence is anecdotal,17 and studies are inconclusive. II Legal scholarship
is notoriously sparse in the area of empirical research. 9 While more
empirical research would be desirable, Sugarman uses the dearth of
literature supporting deterrence as justification for his reasoning that
deterrence does not work. 20  But the absence of such research does
not prove the failure of deterrence, but rather the failure of the legal
academy to study this problem adequately.
One argument against Sugarman's proposition is the recent anal-
ysis of the New Zealand comprehensive no-fault plan now in effect, in
which Professor Richard S. Miller concludes that the New Zealand
experience has led "to a serious failure of deterrence, to an increase in
accidents and accident rates."' 2' Professor Miller proposes reintro-
ducing the tort system in New Zealand to supplement the no-fault
compensation plan. He believes that a combination approach, which
maintains no-fault compensation as the primary source of recovery
for accident victims while allowing access to tort law, would be
desirable.22
15. Id. at 21 & n.50 (criticizing W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 10-11 (1987)).
16. See id. at 23.
17. Richard S. Miller commented to a faculty seminar in New Zealand that "Wellington
was an unusually unsafe and hazardous place" and suggested the absence of tort law as the
reason. Miller was told, "New Zealand had always been that way, even before [the enactment
of a comprehensive no-fault statute covering accidental injury]." Miller, The Future of New
Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme, II U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 6 n.10 (1989).
18. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 22 (elaborating on his problems with these studies as
being unconfirmed and discredited).
19. See, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 181, 703 P.2d 1, 16, 216 Cal. Rptr.
661, 676 (1985) (Grodin, J., concurring) (discussing the need for more empirical evidence);
Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323
(1989); see also Rhode, Gender and Jurisprudence. An Agenda for Research?, 56 U. CIN. L.
REV. 521 (1987) (commenting on the need for empirical evidence in the area of sex
discrimination law).
20. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that Posner and Landes have only thin
favorable evidence and, as pro-deterrence advocates, surely would cite more impressive
evidence if it were available).
21. Miller, supra note 17, at 6.
22. Id. at 64-73.
[Vol. 44:877
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The viability of the tort system in promoting safety is particu-
larly troublesome, given that under Sugarman's proposals, safety,
which all theoretically would agree is desirable,23 is left to regulatory
agencies and implicitly to the political pendulum to which those agen-
cies are subjected. While Sugarman concludes that "[t]he idea that
tort law might deter that many medical or other accidents seems to be
very much wishful thinking to me,"24 he may be "wishfully" minimiz-
ing the influence toward safety which tort law might have. Do we
have enough safety that we can afford to take a chance with having
less?
It is this concern with safety that the plaintiffs' personal injury
bar proudly cite when defending their work.25 The personal injury
bar's case for deterrence suggests that society must be ever vigilant in
advocating safety to make companies improve their products. 6
While it is difficult to ignore the personal injury bar's self-interest in
perpetuating the present system, its contribution in publicizing dan-
gerous products has been substantial. 7
B. The Compensation Goal
Compensating the victims of accidents is also a pressing societal
need. Yet the common law negligence system, which never purported
to be a system designed to compensate accident victims, has been
pressed into service to do just that.2" It is a job for which the system
23. But see Fairlie, Fear of Living: America's Morbid Aversion to Risk, NEW REPUBLIC,
Jan. 23, 1989, at 14 (asserting that risk-taking is necessary and that not enough risk-taking is
undermining America).
24. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 24.
25. See, e.g., Dorfman, 'I'm Proud to Be a Trial Lawyer,' San Francisco Banner Daily J.,
Nov. 14, 1989, at 8, col. 5 (describing a convention of the California Trial Lawyers Association
and the pride speakers felt as "keepers of the flame of consumer protection").
26. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 4.
27. One recent example was the highly publicized DES litigation. See Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833
(1984); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d. 625 (1981); see also S.
FENICHEL & L. CHARFOOS, DAUGHTERS AT RISK: A PERSONAL DES HISTORY (1981).
Another example involved litigation over the Ford Pinto. See Kline v. Ford Motor Co.,
523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (1981).
Another example concerned the Dalkon Shield. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 779
(4th Cir. 1989); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
876 (1986); Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983); see also M.
MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985).
Women were the principal victims in both DES and Dalkon shield cases, where
companies were found liable under the tort system for manufacturing dangerous health care
products.
28. "More and more we are trying to run a compensation system in a fault liability
1990]
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is ill-suited. Common law judges have sought to broaden the liability
base, ensuring solvent defendants for compensation purposes.2 9
Sugarman is critical of these "creative judicial expansions" of
tort law which have made it easier for some victims to recover
because the progressive changes make tort law harder to supplant.3°
He believes the expansion of tort law is damaging because better
approaches to compensation become less urgent as at least some vic-
tims are helped.31 Arguments like this, to the effect that the world
should be kept bad enough so that people will have to do something to
change it, have rarely worked and run contrary to humanitarian
concerns. 32
Nevertheless, there is a compelling argument that a viable com-
pensation system cannot be achieved through the use of tort law. As
Sugarman points out, many victims are uncompensated and many
more are undercompensated.33 Professor Richard L. Abel agrees that
the real tort crisis is that too few claims are brought,34 and that many
"needy, deserving victims" are not recompensed.35
Sugarman correctly emphasizes the arbitrariness of tort compen-
sation. 36 Tort awards begin to resemble a lottery; they are dependent
upon plaintiffs, lawyers, and juries, and yield dissimilar results for
similar victims.37 The lump-sum nature of the tort award creates
arbitrariness in cases both where the patient's injury heals earlier than
anticipated and where the injury is more serious and long-term than
framework." STATE OF NEW YORK INS. DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ... FOR WHOSE
BENEFIT? A REPORT TO GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER 48 (1970), reprinted in M.
FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 11, at 658.
29. See, e.g., J'aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407
(1979) (finding plaintiff entitled to protection from economic losses sustained as a result of
negligence); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976) (finding psychotherapists had a duty to warn intended victim of patient);
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (abandoning
common law categories insulating landowners or occupiers from liability for their negligence).
30. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 36.
31. Id.
32. Cf. D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
51-56 (1987) (Chapter 2, The Benefits to Whites of Civil Rights Legislation: The Chronicle of
the Celestial Curia, uses this theme showing that worsening people's lives is senseless.).
33. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 36-38.
34. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 (1987).
35. See id. at 447; see also id. at 448-52 (describing empirical studies indicating many
injury victims fail to file claims).
36. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 38.
37. Id. Marc Franklin was one of the first scholars to use the term lottery in relation to
tort. See Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective
Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967).
[Vol. 44:877
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originally expected. 38
C. The Justice or Fairness Goal
Turning to justice or fairness, Sugarman rejects the corrective
justice rationalization for tort law. He reviews the literature defend-
ing tort law, including Holmes, who based his arguments on the need
to punish unreasonable conduct; Fletcher, who focused on
nonreciprocal risktaking; and Epstein, who explained tort law as fun-
damentally related to the causation of harm.39 Sugarman dismisses
these arguments, concluding that "the pursuit of corrective justice
through ordinary torts cases is an extravagance primarily benefiting
lawyers and the insurance industry."'
Sugarman argues that the theory of corrective justice is unrealis-
tic as applied to defendants. The advent of liability insurance and the
doctrine of respondeat superior ensure that plaintiffs are not compen-
sated by their injurers. 41 He also examines the notion that the per-
sonal injury award is the victim's basic source of compensation.
Noting that victims are often paid by collateral sources, he questions
the fairness of requiring a defendant's employer or insurer to pay a
second time.42 Sugarman contends that it is unrealistic to assume that
victims naturally want redress from their injurers.43 He asserts that it
is "the lure of substantial financial awards," not the need to soothe
one's outrage, that encourages victims to file tort claims." Finally,
Sugarman reviews the arbitrariness of tort law. Recognizing that luck
plays an important role in the receipt of a tort award, he concludes
that "the current system functions whimsically and not in accord with
anyone's sense of justice."45
38. See S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 35-41 (discussing uncompensated and under-
compensated victims and excessive and unnecessary compensation).
39. Id. at 57-60.
40. Id. at 62. For an interesting and different corrective justice justification for the tort
system, see Hantzis, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. - (1990) (forthcoming) (arguing that pragmatism provides a
corrective justice rationale for tort law). If there is a corrective justice case for tort law,
Hantzis article articulates it, but given the cost issues of the tort system and its failure as a
compensation system, I remain unconvinced.
41. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 54-55.
42. Id. at 56.
43. Id.
44. Id. While Sugarman may be correct in most instances, some would argue that it is
unrealistic to dismiss human nature's penchant for vengeance and retribution.
45. Id.
1990]
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III. SURVEYING CURRENT REFORMS
Given the valid criticisms of tort law, some changes in the tort
compensation system seem certain to occur in our legal lifetime. The
only question is what form will these changes take. Sugarman
describes the reform efforts begun by the Reagan administration and
representatives of corporate defendants and their insurers to curtail
victim's rights.46 These reform proposals, which Sugarman calls "tort
tinkering, include repudiating strict liability in products cases,"
limiting attorney contingent fees,49 limiting awards for pain and suf-
fering and punitive damages, 50 abandoning the collateral source
rule,51 and eliminating joint and several liability.52
These efforts on the defense side to alter tort law and yet keep it
afloat, counterpoised with the plaintiffs' personal injury bar's attempts
to maintain the status quo,53 are reminiscent of the jockeying between
first- and third-party insurers in the early 1970's over whether to
retain tort law with the modification of comparative fault or whether
to adopt no-fault automobile compensation schemes. 54 As Sugarman
points out, however, even the reform package most advantageous to
the defense will not solve the high insurance premium crisis because
the uncertainty of lawsuits will remain.5
Sugarman believes that these current reform ideas are false starts,
and he attacks the "timid" American Bar Association which con-
46. See id. at 75 (Chapter 4, Curtailing Victims' Rights). Sugarman also addresses tort
reform designed to benefit victims, noting that judicial developments have served plaintiffs
well. Id. at 76-77.
47. Id. at 77.
48. Id. at 79; see, e.g., Jones, Products Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy
of Contract over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731 (1990) (arguing that tort liability should be
abolished in cases involving commercial loss).
49. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 79-83 (discussing legislative reforms).
50. Id. at 79.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 79-80. California voters eliminated joint and several liability for noneconomic
harms by voter initiative in 1986. Fair Responsibility Act of 1986, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431-
1431.1 (West 1986).
The notion that tort reform can be accomplished by voter initiative, requiring voters to
understand the complex, interconnected issues of tort reform seems an abdication of legislative
responsibility. See Wildman, Propositions Are the Wrong Way for Tort Reform, Los Angeles
Daily J., Nov. 7, 1988, at 6, col. 3.
53. See S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 85 (acknowledging that the plaintiffs' personal
injury bar is a political force).
54. The adoption of comparative negligence in many states "saved" the tort system in the
auto accident arena from yielding to no-fault. See M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 11,
at 380 (describing the flood of legislation favoring comparative negligence as having "received
a considerable boost from efforts to undermine proponents of no-fault auto insurance").
55. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 92.
[Vol. 44:877
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cluded that tort law is an achievement that should be left alone. 56 No
one escapes Sugarman's critique. He has attacked the right, center,
and left. The political question remaining is how might his own pro-
posed changes be brought about.5" Before approaching that practical
problem, Sugarman turns to the existing and proposed no-fault alter-
natives to tort law.
Sugarman is critical of piecemeal no-fault alternatives to tort law
because the resulting system would "look like a crazy quilt." He
reviews the development of no-fault in the automobile area, 9 and the
use of elective plans in high school athletics, 6° but prefers elective no-
fault plans only "on the way to some other arrangement." 6'
The most ambitious modern no-fault accident compensation
plan, that of New Zealand, replaces tort damages with "guaranteed
compensation for lost income, medical expenses, and rehabilitation
costs without regard to type of accident or fault."' 62 A British propo-
sal originating at Oxford is even more sweeping, covering all disabled
under a single social welfare scheme, but it has not yet been
adopted.63 Sugarman commends the British for "rethinking these
problems from the ground up,"' and recognizes that their approach
is similar to his own.
Arguing for a more comprehensive approach to disability than
the confines of tort law permits, Sugarman challenges the reader to
consider whether it makes sense to treat the victims of accidents and
illness differently.65 Others before Sugarman have asked and
answered this question in the negative. As early as 1967, Marc
Franklin wrote, "I do not see why, as an initial proposition, today's
law should care how a limb was broken, whether by an intentional
wrongdoer, a negligent automobile driver, a non-negligent driver, a
wall toppled by an earthquake or a fall in the bathtub. 66
Two recent natural disasters, the earthquake in Northern Cali-
56. Id. at 88.
57. See id. at 167 (discussing the political realities that could result in the adoption of his
proposed changes).
58. Id. at 103.
59. Id. at 103-04.
60. Id. at 104.
61. Id. at 106.
62. Id. at 110. Sugarman uses this phrase to describe several proposed comprehensive
compensation plans, including New Zealand's. For extensive literature on New Zealand's
plan, see id. at 120 n.37; Miller, supra note 17.
63. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 114-15.
64. Id. at 115.
65. Id. at 113.
66. Franklin, supra note 37, at 777, cited in S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 110.
1990]
HeinOnline  -- 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 885 1989-1990
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
fornia6 7 and Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina,6" underscore the
logic of Franklin's and Sugarman's pleas to address the needs of the
disabled, regardless of the source of their illness or misfortune. In an
uncharacteristically swift legislative response to the earthquake, Cali-
fornia enacted a no-fault compensation plan providing injured earth-
quake victims with prompt monetary relief.69 This type of legislation,
which allows prompt victim compensation and preserves later tort
claims, might prove to be a useful prototype for a combination reform
approach, joining immediate compensation and preservation of tort
claims, that could extend beyond merely disaster relief.
IV. REPLACING TORT LAW
In Part III of the book, entitled Better Ideas, Sugarman sets forth
his ideal solution to the problems of the personal injury system. He
advocates separating the compensation and behavior control func-
tions of the existing structure.7 °
Sugarman's plan meets the compensation goals through an
employment-related compensation package: "If we could put nearly
everyone in a broadly equivalent position to those with good
employee benefits, our need to use tort law to compensate for eco-
nomic loss would essentially disappear. "71 His definition of "good
employee benefits" includes income replacement and compensation
for medical expenses, while it excludes non-economic losses, presuma-
bly pain and suffering and emotional distress. 72
Another issue raised by Sugarman's proposal is how to award
benefits to those citizens not covered by an employee benefits plan.
67. See generally Magnuson, Earthquake, TIME, Oct. 30, 1989, at 30.
68. See generally Magnuson, Winds of Chaos, TIME, Oct. 2, 1989, at 16.
69. San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge and 1-880 Cypress Structure Disaster Relief
[New] Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 997 (West 1989); see also Dresslar, Legislature Poised to OK
No-Fault, Fast Payment Quake Claims Legislation, Los Angeles Daily J., Nov. 6, 1989, at 4,
col. 2; Dresslar, CTLA Supports Quake Tort Claim Plan, Los Angeles Daily J., Nov. 2, 1989,
at 4, col. 4.
70. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 125.
71. Id.
72. For an interesting discussion of "intangible losses," in the present tort framework,
suggesting that damage awards be limited to "transferable, out-of-pocket expenses," see
Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 809
(1985).
Sugarman does not directly address negligent infliction of emotional distress, a tort of
recent origin, particularly as it applies to bystanders watching a tortfeasor's negligence. He
leaves open the question of whether a victim could be compensated for therapy bills under the
medical coverage part of his plan, or whether the interest presently protected by this tort
would not be covered.
The implication of the book is that this interest would not be protected. Sugarman does
say he would eliminate tort law for defamation plaintiffs, who would have to be recompensed
[Vol. 44:877
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Conceding that "policy makers must address our collective responsi-
bility toward all people who do not have income because they are not
at work,"73 Sugarman examines how this problem has been handled
under other compensation regimes. Existing tort law considers the
probable future earnings of disabled children, students, or homemak-
ers as a means for placing a dollar value on their recovery.7 4 No-fault
compensation plans have not been consistent in their treatment of this
issue: Israel covers disabled homemakers,75 while New Zealand's
plan has been criticized for failing to cover non-earning groups "well
and consistently."' 76 Providing the funding for the compensation of
non-earners is a problem; Sugarman's solution is that homemakers or
disabled adults who do not qualify for earning related benefits should
receive Social Security disability benefits.77
The problem of compensation for non-earners is exacerbated by
the problem of the replacement cost of household services that must
be purchased when the injured non-earner, who probably was the pro-
vider of these services, is unable to perform that work.78 While
replacement costs are a problem not just of tort victims but of any
disabled citizen, tort law with its imprecise recovery package may
cushion that loss. Sugarman is overly optimistic about temporary
replacements by family and friends, contending that "other household
members, friends, and more distant relatives can pick up the slack at
least for a time." 7
9
Though pain and suffering awards are frequently criticized,"°
Sugarman would retain such compensation, but limit maximum
by the same mechanism used for accident victims. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 162. The
problem of defamation plaintiffs and the harms they suffer bears further discussion.
For a good discussion suggesting ways tort liability might augment no-fault plans by
allowing tort recovery for nonphysical harm, thereby protecting a victim's dignitary interest,
see Love, Actions for Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between the Tort System and No-
Fault Compensation (with an Emphasis on Workers' Compensation), 73 CALIF. L. REV. 857
(1985).
73. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 128.
74. Id. at 132.
75. Id. at 149 n. 11 (providing a source for further details on this coverage).
76. Id. at 149 n.12.
77. Id. at 139. Sugarman concedes, "[t]he level of benefits provided to such people and the
degree of disability necessary for eligibility are difficult questions." Id.
78. Id. at 133.
79. Id. at 193 n.13.
80. See, e.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 511-13, 364 P.2d 337,
345-47, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169-71 (1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (discussing the criticism of
pain and suffering awards); see also O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for
Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants'Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV.
333; O'Connell & Simon, Payment for Pain & Suffering: Who Wants What, When and Why?,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
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awards to $150,000.81 The New Zealand plan provides compensation
for pain and suffering as well.82
With compensation covered by social insurance, Sugarman looks
briefly at safety regulation. He advocates "accident prevention
through regulatory strategies, with the increased involvement of citi-
zens, victims, and citizen groups. ' 83 Conceding that administrative
agencies may be captured by those they supposedly regulate and
admitting the need to make agencies "more responsive and more
effective,"' 84 Sugarman's reliance on regulatory agencies to insure
safety seems a bit naive.
Sugarman would reply, correctly, that the presence or absence of
tort law does not solve the problem of regulatory agencies failing to
perform their job. Yet putting safety regulation exclusively into the
hands of administrative agencies would not make them more effective
either. Sugarman believes that tort law is too expensive a safety net to
maintain, given its minimal returns.8 5 Although tort law is expensive,
I am unable to take this step with him, at least until we see whether
some of his idealism about greater safety through agency regulation
can happen in reality.
Turning to the practical politics of instituting his reforms,
Sugarman assesses the "traditional legislative fight" about tort reform
as one between business and insurance on one side against consumers
and plaintiffs' lawyers on the other.8 6 Seeking to change the political
alignment, Sugarman's proposal is meant to "link together victim,
consumer, and business interests."' 87 His goal is to eliminate personal
injury claims for those disabilities lasting less than six months, by pro-
viding temporary disability benefits to those injured.88 Serious injury
cases would remain in the tort system and blunt "the criticism of
those who still believe that tort serves important deterrence and pun-
ishment functions."8 9
81. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 143.
82. Id. at 134.
83. Id. at 153.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 155. "[T]he contention that tort law keeps regulatory agencies alive is ultimately
unconvincing." Id. at 154.
86. Id. at 167.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 169. Non-earners, of course, receive no benefits, but Sugarman assumes they are
relying on some other income source anyway. The problem of replacing their labor in the
family unit remains. However, Sugarman does urge that non-earners who were recently in the
labor force should be paid temporary disability benefits (presumably this solution would cover
the maternity leave problem). Id. at 170.
89. Id. at 191.
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Once this initial step of removing small claims from the system
and changing the rules in cases of serious injury is adopted, Sugarman
says the stage would be set "for the additional intermediate steps that
might be necessary to reach a comprehensive long-run program [for
compensating accident victims] that did not at all rely on private acci-
dent law." 90
V. INITIATING CHANGE
One way to look at the social problem of tort reform is to ask:
What is the reality?; what is the ideal?; and how might we get there
from here?91 The next question becomes whether to move incre-
mentally or all at once.
For example, the California Supreme Court in Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals92 took the leap of allowing recovery in emo-
tional distress cases absent proof of physical consequences of the emo-
tional distress, relying on the jury to look for "genuineness" in the
circumstances of the case. 93 The New York Court of Appeals, how-
ever, moved incrementally by creating a landscape dotted with excep-
tions94 to the requirement of physical consequences in cases involving
negligent handling of corpses, 95 wrongful notification of death by tele-
graph, 96 and negligent counseling regarding the need to obtain an
abortion. 97 No physical injury was required in these exceptional
cases; perhaps when the landscape is filled with exceptions the rule
will be swept away.9"
Although he advocates two steps to his goal of sweeping tort law
away, Sugarman's approach is more like the approach taken by Cali-
fornia. A more incremental approach might involve doing away with
90. Id. at 212.
91. Cf. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581 (1977) (taking this approach on the issue of affirmative action);
Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. - (1990) (forthcoming) (taking the
same approach in this work in progress).
92. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
93. Id. at 926, 616 P.2d at 818-19, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836-37.
94. Professor Marc Franklin compared New York's and California's approaches.
Conversation with Marc Franklin, Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, in San Francisco
(Fall 1983).
95. Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp., 202 N.Y. 259, 95 N.E. 695 (1911).
96. Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975).
97. Martinez v. Long Island Hillside Jewish Medical Center, 70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d
538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987).
98. For cases sweeping away the many exceptions to the landowner-land occupier no duty
or limited duty rules and replacing all the exceptions with a single standard of reasonable care,
see Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Basso v.
Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976).
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tort law in specific areas, as we already have done in workers' com-
pensation99 and in the no-fault automobile accident arena in some
states.1°° When a substantial number of these compensation systems
have taken over, people might feel more comfortable with tort reform.
Sugarman acknowledges this possibility,'' but seems to ask, "Why
wait?"
VI. REFLECTIONS
We live in a society that commodifies everything, giving every-
thing a price tag and trying to make it fungible."°2 As a response in
the tort arena, Richard L. Abel advocates eliminating damages for
emotional distress.10 3 According to Abel, maintaining "such damages
extend[s] capitalism's commodification of labor to all human experi-
ence."'  But money is the societal medium of exchange. It is no less
demeaning to quantify the cost of a limb or of a life than one's emo-
tional harm. Those personal injury damages are as much commodi-
fied and objectionable on that basis. And yet money is the universal
symbol of value in this culture. Until we change that fact, the failure
to award monetary damages for nonpecuniary harms devalues their
loss. Insofar as those damages are about connection and caring,
which are already undervalued in this culture, 10 5 not to award dam-
ages for their loss perpetuates that undervaluation and renders invisi-
ble their importance to society. 106
99. See Love, supra note 72, at 857 & n.1 (discussing the enactment of workers'
compensation legislation by every jurisdiction in the United States).
100. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 103 (discussing broad no-fault auto plans).
For a discussion of specific areas where tort law is being replaced incrementally, see id. at
106-10 (discussing no-fault benefits for children injured by vaccines); see also Rabin, Some
Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 46 (1988) (suggesting
that changes in the tort system are likely to be "addressed in narrowly-focused, incremental
terms, barring a broadly conceived social reform movement").
101. See, e.g., S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 88-89 (discussing the ABA's Action
Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System, which adopted an incremental approach to
reform).
102. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (discussing
contested market-inalienable areas).
103. Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRIT. J.L. & SOC'Y. 199 (1981).
104. Abel, supra note 34, at 444.
105. For the classic work on connection and caring as part of women's moral structure
unrecognized by the dominant culture, see C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). But see Feminist Discourse,
Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 28 (1985) (MacKinnon
states that the feminine voice is unrecognizable as long as a foot is placed on our necks.).
106. See Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 3
(1988) (articulating ways in which tort law has developed in terms of the male societal norm);
see also Finley, A Break in the Silence.: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, I YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 51-54 (1989) (discussing caretaking issues in the law of damages).
[Vol. 44:877
HeinOnline  -- 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 890 1989-1990
ENLIGHTENED SOCIAL INSURANCE
Also, to the extent that Sugarman's proposals institutionalize the
invisibility of nonearner work, it poses a serious problem for all
womanist thinkers.107 Sugarman's plan for compensation is tied to
workers. Women who labor without employment benefits as child-
care workers or housecleaners are not compensated under this plan
because they are not paid in the workforce and therefore are not iden-
tified as workers, or as present in the labor force. Thus, the home-
makers' work is rendered invisible, and devalued as well, because paid
labor is the important and legitimating category.10 8
The devaluation of household work is not a problem Sugarman
invented, and it is a relief that his work at least recognizes and is
concerned about the homemaker situation. But Sugarman seems to
think all homemakers are attached to someone in the workforce who
can foot the recovery bill, when this may not be the case. Women
who are divorced, living on child support, working part-time without
benefits or another household earner, or in the labor force, but invisi-
ble to it (for example, a housecleaner getting paid cash), may find
their income sources inadequate if they became injured and could not
turn to tort recovery.
In addition to the personal compensation of these workers, a sig-
nificant problem relating to work performed in the home, generally
unpaid women's work, is that the cost of replacing household work is
staggering. Tort law theoretically does take care of that need by pro-
viding a large cushion of recovery for those who do win the tort
lottery.
These problems may not be reasons not to do away with tort law,
but these issues should be addressed as part of any wholesale reform.
If we are traveling the road from reality to a more ideal state of
affairs, that future should be as ideal as possible.
107. Like Alice Walker, I prefer the term womanist. Walker explains:
"Womanist" encompasses "feminist" as it is defined in Webster's, but also
means instinctively pro-woman. It is not in the dictionary at all. Nonetheless, it
has a strong root in Black women's culture. It comes (to me) from the word
"womanish," a word our mothers used to describe, and attempt to inhibit,
strong, outrageous or outspoken behavior when we were children: "You're
acting womanish!" A labeling that failed, for the most part, to keep us from
acting "womanish" whenever we could, that is to say, like our mothers
themselves, and like other women we admired.
Walker, Coming Apart, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY 95, 100 n.*
(L. Lederer ed. 1980); see also Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539, 543.
108. This predicament is not exclusive to homemakers' work. Others not identified as
present in the labor force would also be affected.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Is it a fantasy to think that employers, interested in profit to the
exclusion of all else, will enact an enlightened social welfare system
for their workers without government regulation or intervention?
Sugarman believes they might if it will save them money in insurance
premiums (for liability insurance),1 9 but will it really save money? 0
Some employers without high premiums in low risk businesses will
face increased costs because of these augmented employee benefits.
Can taking good care of their workers be sold to businesses as a good
idea, even if it will not enhance profits, just because it is the right
thing to do?
I would like to be as optimistic about human nature as
Sugarman. We have much to lose by not trying, given the coalition
that stands poised to make changes in tort law anyway, which will
undermine victim compensation considerably. Accident victims seem
unlikely to have the political clout to be able to retain the status quo.
If changes are inevitable, looking in Sugarman's direction will cer-
tainly move us toward a more just society.
109. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 187.
110. Sugarman concedes "providing firm answers to these important questions is not easy,
and at this point I am able only to provide some analysis about tendencies." Id.
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